Recalling the Space Shuttle Challenger's Explosion

This reporter watched the space shuttle explode in Central Florida on Jan. 28, 1986.

The space shuttle Challenger lifts off from Kennedy Space Center, Fla., Jan. 28, 1986, in a cloud of smoke with a crew of seven aboard. The shuttle exploded after this photo, taken from atop the Vehicular Assembly Building, was made.

 

 

 

By Tim Smart Jan. 28, 2016, at 12:01 a.m. + More 

 

It was cold, at least for Central Florida, on Jan. 28, 1986. In Orlando, a record low of 26 prompted the usual concern about the effects freezing temperatures would have on the region's important citrus industry. Melbourne, some 35 miles south of the Kennedy Space Center, also posted a record low of 26 degrees.
By mid-morning, the Florida sun had warmed the air a little and it was 36 degrees when the space shuttle Challenger blasted off. That was 15 degrees cooler than any previous launch.
There was excitement and pride across the region, indeed the nation, in anticipation of Challenger's launch, with New Hampshire teacher Christa McAuliffe aboard. Making trips into space commonplace and getting the nation's youth excited about it again was a key goal of NASA. Around the country, classrooms took a break so children could watch on TV. Attending a regional economic conference as a business reporter for the Orlando Sentinel, I joined in to watch the launch from a rooftop some 50 miles away.
Tragically, a small, plastic O-ring used as a seal to block gases from escaping the shuttle's solid booster rockets and coming into contact with the massive external gas tank became less resilient as temperatures begin to drop, especially below 50 degrees. A written recommendation existed that advised against launches where the ambient temperature was below 53 degrees, but those in charge of the actual launch were unaware of it.
As the shuttle headed upward into the sky, the O-ring began to fail and gas began leaking. The spacecraft also encountered the high-altitude wind shear that is anticipated and the systems onboard reacted to counter it. But the leak continued, and in a matter of seconds structural failure overcame the external tank and the shuttle began disintegrating just 73 seconds into its flight. Those who were watching, whether in Florida or around the nation, could sense something was terribly awry. The seven crewmembers perished.
Investigations would later reveal the shuttle was anything but the safe space vehicle that NASA wanted the world to believe. The idea that there was anything routine about a space shuttle launch, even after 24 prior missions, was far from the truth.
Riding in the shuttle was more akin to strapping yourself to a gas tank and lighting the fuse. In the months that followed the tragedy, I and many other reporters would uncover vast evidence of problems with the shuttle. The culture of NASA and the willingness of personnel to speak out about issues also drew scrutiny. The nation had its "aha" moment when a mid-level government analyst provided information to The New York Times that there was a history of issues with the O-rings and that the seal had shown signs of erosion in a dozen previous launches. The Rogers Commission, which investigated the Challenger tragedy, then held closed-door sessions and learned that engineers for the maker of the solid rocket booster had advised against launch the night before.
In June of that year, the commission issued its report but by then the disclosures had already eroded NASA's "can-do" spirit and the nation would never again hold the space agency in such reverence.

As I wrote in a front-page article for the paper on June 10:

WASHINGTON — Calling it "an accident rooted in history," the Challenger commission Monday blamed the Jan. 28 shuttle tragedy on a faulty booster rocket joint that went unfixed for years by a bureaucracy buckling under the pressure of an unrealistic flight schedule.
NASA was trying to do too much with too little, leading autonomous mid-level managers to sweep under the rug critical safety concerns that were a threat to the lives of its astronauts, the panel concluded in its report to President Reagan.

The 13-member panel, representing the finest minds in academia, science and the aerospace industry, said a new management structure was needed at the space agency, along with a redesigned joint on the solid rocket booster.
The report faulted NASA for the way it dealt with safety issues that were known internally but not always communicated to those whose job it was to make critical launch decisions.
"We've suffered a tragedy and a setback," Reagan said in comments from the White House, "but we'll forge ahead, wiser this time and undaunted – as undaunted as the spirit of the Challenger and her seven heroes."
Reagan is gone now, too. And for many, the Challenger tragedy is but a memory. The nation has suffered other tragedies since, not least of which was 9/11. But 30 years back, Jan. 28, 1986, was one of the country's saddest days.